AI agent security boundaries in OpenClaw 2026.5.27
AI agent security boundaries in OpenClaw 2026.5.27 separate untrusted prompts, tool execution, network exposure and approvals so agent failures stay contained.
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Prompt Injection
5 articles connected to this topic.
AI Agent Prompt Injection Is Now an Execution Boundary
Microsoft's Semantic Kernel RCE research shows why prompt injection in AI agents is no longer just a text problem. Here's how self-hosted agent builders should think about tool boundaries.
Semantic Kernel RCE shows why AI agent tool inputs need real boundaries
Microsoft's Semantic Kernel RCE research shows how prompt injection becomes code execution when agents can influence tool parameters. Here's how to reduce the blast radius.
Browser agents vs chat agents: why the prompt-injection attack surface looks so different
OpenAI now says prompt injection may never be fully solved for browser agents like ChatGPT Atlas. Here is what that means for chat-channel agents and self-hosted setups.
PleaseFix: How a Calendar Invite Can Hijack Your AI Browser Agent
Zenity Labs' PleaseFix disclosure reveals zero-click attacks against agentic browsers like Perplexity Comet — stealing files and passwords through routine tasks. What OpenClaw users should learn about agent trust boundaries.